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Abstract
Starting from the axiomatisation of polarisation contained in Esteban and
Ray (1994) and Chakravarty and Majumdar (2001) we investigate whether
peoples perceptions of income polarisation is consistent with the key ax-
ioms. This is carried out using a questionnaire-experimental approach that
combines both paper questionnaires and on-line interactive techniques. The
responses suggest that important axioms which serve to di¤erentiate polar-
isation from inequality  e.g. increased bipolarisation  as well as other
distinctive features of polarisation, i.e. the non-monotonous behaviour at-
tributed to polarisation, are not widely accepted.
 Acknowledgements. Xavier Ramos aknowledges nancial support from
the Spanish Ministry of Eduaction and Science project SEC2002-10688-
E. We thank Maria Cervini for outstanding research assistance. We
also thank Michael Brooks, Paul Blacklow, Elias Khalil, Nathalie Mc-
Caughey, Vai-Lam Mui..Carlos Troncoso, Eugenia Plá, Gastón Chaves,
Gemma Francés, Hèctor Sala, Jaime Amoroso, José Alonso, María
Cervini, Maria Cubel, Oriol Roca, Raúl Cervini, Rosa Martínez, Sara
Ayllón, Olga Cantó, Coral del Río, Carlos Gradín, Giovanni Ko, Nazan
Susam, Artur Colom and Cristina Blanco who helped to organise the
questionnaires for us in various institutions. We are very grateful for
comments from Joan Esteban, Debraj Ray and Rafael Salas.
 Keywords: polarisation, income distribution, inequality
 JEL Classication: D63
 Correspondence to: F. A. Cowell, STICERD, LSE, Houghton St, Lon-
don WC2A 2AE. (f.cowell@lse.ac.uk)
1 Introduction
The topic of income polarisation has come to play a key role in the analy-
sis of the evolution of income distribution, of the consequences of economic
growth and of social conict. In order to make use of this concept in eco-
nomic models the idea of polarisation has to be transformed into a precise
criterion that can be applied to income distributions: typically some kind of
polarisation measure is used. The approach to the measurement of polarisa-
tion is usually based on a specic axiom system such as those introduced by
Esteban and Ray (1994) and others. However, although the recent work on
polarisation is persuasive, it is not clear that the particular axiomatic struc-
tures that have been suggested capture the meaning of polarisation as it is
commonly understood by social commentators and lay people. Indeed, in
popular discussion the terms polarisationand inequalityare not usually
clearly distinguished.1
The purpose of this paper is to address this issue by investigating the
way distributional comparisons are actually perceived. In doing so we focus
on ordinal issues concerning the measurement of polarisation rather than on
specic polarisation measures. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2
examines the meaning that has been given to the concept of polarisation in
the recent literature. Section 3 explains the approach we have adopted in
eliciting peoples views and perceptions of polarisation. Section 4 describes
the samples used for our study and Sections 5 to 7 examine the results.
Section 8 concludes.
2 The meaning of polarisation
In other social-science disciplines polarisation is often considered as a process.
In politics, it is a process by which the public opinion divides and goes to the
extremes. In communications and psychology the process involves a social or
political group dividing into two opposing sub-groups with fewer and fewer
members of the group remaining neutral or holding an intermediate position.
In the case of income polarisation the accepted meaning is less clear cut, but
no less interesting.
The concept of polarisation assumes the existence of poles normally two.
It also assumes the agglomeration of members of the community at more than
1For example a summary by the BBC of a recent empirical study of the
UK income distribution noted [...] during the 1980s and 1990s inequal-
ity had increased, as a polarisation in British society had occurred. See
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6901147.stm
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one pole. In the context of income polarisation the poles are simply income
levels. Beyond this one needs to provide some kind of structure that gives
meaning to the concept as well as the basis for deriving computable indices.
This is the role played by the introduction of an explicit axiomatisation as
in the classic study by Esteban and Ray (1994) and the recent paper by
Chakravarty and Majumdar (2001).2 The typical axiom systems and the
meaning of individual axioms are discussed below in section 2.1.
Some of the axioms used to pin down the meaning of polarisation com-
parisons have a similar avour to those used in the literature on income in-
equality, social welfare and poverty and we will nd that it is appropriate to
analyse these in a manner that draws on the empirical literature concerning
attitudes to distributional comparisons that have been developed in those re-
lated elds. However not too much should be made of this similarity because
polarisation is a distinct concept and requires a distinct axiomatisation.
In particular it is important to recognise the essential di¤erences between
inequality and polarisation. Indeed it is arguable that one of the driving
forces that led to the formulation of an explicit concept of income polarisation
in the 1990s was the recognition that inequality, as conventionally dened,
misses out on some key aspects of the evolution of income distributions over
time that should be of concern to policy analysts and social commentators
(Wolfson 1994, 1997). The key to the conventional approach to inequality
is the transfer principle but it is not clear that respect for this principle is
always appropriate for distributional comparisons in terms of polarisation.
2.1 Axioms
In the literature there are a number of alternative axiom systems for po-
larisation; we concentrate here on those in Esteban and Ray (1994) and
Chakravarty and Majumdar (2001) and present them in a uniform notation.
An income distribution is given by a pair (p;x) where p 2 Rn+, x 2 Rn++
and the set of all such pairs is denoted by D; in other words we characterise
a distribution as a vector of non-negative population masses (p1; p2; :::; pn)
located on the rungsof an income ladder (x1; x2; :::; xn), where each rung
is a strictly positive number. A polarisation index is a function P : D ! R+.
For any (p;x) 2 D let the median be given by
x^ = x^ (p;x) = max
(
xj :
jX
i=1
pi  1
2
nX
i=1
pi
)
:
2See also the contributions by Wang and Tsui (2000), Rodriguez and Salas (2003),
Bossert and Schworm (2006) and Esteban et al. (2007).
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The median can be used to divide the population into two groups (poorer,
richer) that provide intuition for some of the axioms. In the following
description of the axioms the labels ERxmeans Axiom x in Esteban and
Ray (1994); the others are those used by Chakravarty and Majumdar (2001)
or are in common use elsewhere.
The axioms in Esteban and Ray (1994) are all stated in terms of an
elementary three-rungincome distribution. Accordingly in Axioms 1 to 4
we assume that p and x have dimension 3, that p > 0 and that x1  x2  x3.3
Axiom 1 (ER1) Let p1 > p2 = p3 and x1 < x2 < x3. Then, for p2=p1
su¢ ciently small and x3=x2 su¢ ciently small:
P ((p1; 2p2) ; (x1;
p
x2x3)) > P (p;x)
Axiom 2 (ER2) Let p1 > p3 and x2=x1 > x3=x2 > 1. Then there exists a
small positive  such that
P (p; (x1; x2 + ; x3)) > P (p;x)
Axiom 3 (ER3) Let x3=x2 = x2=x1 > 1. Then for all  2
 
0; 1
2
p2

:
P ((p1 + ; p2   2; p3 + ) ;x) > P (p;x)
Axiom 4 (ER4) Let p2 > p3 and x3=x2 = x2=x1 > 1. Then, for p1 and
p2   p3 su¢ ciently small and for  2 (0; p1):
P ((p1   ; p2; p3 + ) ;x)  P (p;x)
Other axioms can be conveniently stated for arbitrary members of the set
of income distributions D.
Axiom 5 (Increased spread) Consider (p;x0), (p;x) 2 D such that x0h =
xh, h 6= i and let  > 0. If either (a) xi < x^ and x0i = xi    or (b) xi > x^
and x0i = xi +  then P (p;x
0) > P (p;x).
Axiom 6 (Increased bipolarity) Consider (p;x0), (p;x) 2 D such that
x0i = xi + , x
0
j = xj   , x0h = xh, h 6= i; j where xi + 2  xj and  > 0. If
either (a) xi < xj < x^ or (b) xj > xi > x^ then P (p;x0) > P (p;x).
3Esteban and Ray (1994) work with log incomes, which explains the use of the geometric
mean (instead of the arithmetic mean) in Axiom 1. in addition one could follow Esteban
and Rays practice and normalise x1  1, but this is not essential.
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Axiom 7 (Principle of population ) For any (p;x) 2 D and any posi-
tive integer m, P (mp;x) = P (p;x)
Axiom 8 (Scale independence) For any (p;x) 2 D and any  > 0,
P (p;x) = P (p;x)
Axiom 9 (Translation independence) For any (p;x) 2 D and any  2
R, P (p;x+ 1n) = P (p;x)
The interpretation of the Esteban and Ray (1994) axioms is as follows:
polarisation is increased by pooling two small population masses on the up-
per income rungs4 (Axiom 1), by increasing intermediate income in a special
three-income society (Axiom 2) or by moving population mass from the
middle outwards (Axiom 3); migration from a very small population mass at
a low income to a moderately-sized high income (Axiom 4) will not reduce
polarisation. Alternatively (from Chakravarty and Majumdar 2001) polar-
isation must increase if you decrease the income of someone in the poorer
group or if you increase the income of someone in the richer group (Axiom
5), or if you bunch incomes closer together within the poorer or the richer
group (Axiom 6). Finally some general points about structure: Polarisation
remains unchanged if you replicate the population (Axiom 7); if we accept
Axiom 8 then merely rescaling all incomes together leaves polarisation un-
changed; but if we accept Axiom 9 then adding (or subtracting) the same
absolute amount to all incomes leaves polarisation unchanged. 5
It is interesting to compare these with axioms that are commonly in-
voked in other topics within the eld of distributional analysis. Axiom 7 and
Axioms 8 or 9 of course appear in many contexts including poverty and in-
equality. Axiom 5 part (a) corresponds to the monotonicity axiom in poverty
analysis if the poverty line is below median income. The income transforma-
tion implied in Axiom 3 is consistent with an inequality change that respects
the transfer principle (Dalton 1920): i.e. in this special case polarisation and
inequality move in the same direction. But it is a very special case. Contrast
this with the income transfers implied in Axiom 6 where the implied transfer
is entirely on one side of the median and it is clear that polarisation must go
up exactly where inequality must go down according to the transfer principle.
Finally note that some axioms appear to be closely related: for example
Axiom 6 appears to be a more general form of Axiom 1 and Axiom 2 is
4Replacing x2; x3 by their geometric mean
5Clearly it may also make sense to consider alternatively an intermediate position
between scale-independence and translation independence. This is analogous to interme-
diate inequality measures (Bossert and Pngsten 1990); other forms of systematic income-
dependence may also be relevant (Amiel and Cowell 1999a).
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similar to part (b) of Axiom 5. We shall have more to say about these
apparent similarities below and a formal discussion is in Appendix A.
2.2 Measures
Corresponding to specic subsets of the axioms introduced in section 2.1 we
nd specic classes of polarisation measure. For example, by focusing on the
partition induced by the median (Axioms 5 to 7) one is led naturally to the
following class of measures
P I(p;x) := 
 
I
 
p ;x

; I
 
p+;x

; x^;  ;+

(1)
where  is strictly decreasing in each of its rst two arguments, I is an
inequality index satisfying the transfer principle, x^ := x^ (p;x) and
p i :=
8<:
pi if xi < x^
0 otherwise
;
p+i :=
8<:
pi if xi > x^
0 otherwise
;
  :=
Pn
i=1 p
 
i xiPn
i=1 p
 
i
;
+ :=
Pn
i=1 p
+
i xiPn
i=1 p
+
i
.
This is the approach of Chakravarty and Majumdar (2001) and Wang and
Tsui (2000).6 By contrast, by invoking Axioms 1-3 and assuming a quasi-
additive structure for the polarisation index, Esteban and Ray (1994) derived
the index
P(p;x) :=
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
p1+i pj
logxjxi
 ; (2)
where  is a positive parameter.7
Of course this still leaves the exact characterisation of the polarisation
measure open-ended. For the measure P I one still has to specify the index I
6In addition to Axioms 5 to 7 Chakravarty and Majumdar (2001) invoke three other
properties, symmetry, normalisation and continuity, to derive their measure (see their
Proposition 1).
7See Esteban and Ray (1994) Theorem 1.
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Chakravarty and Majumdar (2001) suggest the Atkinson index, Wang and
Tsui (2000) suggest the Gini. For the measure P one still has to specify the
parameter  Esteban and Ray (1994) provide an argument that it must be
less than 1:6 (implicit in the proof of their Theorem 1) and, if Axiom 4 is
invoked, it must be greater than 1.8 Clearly, whether P I satises Axiom 8
or Axiom 9 or some other general principle of income levels (see footnote 5
above) will depend in part on the properties of the I that has been specied;
clearly also P satises Axiom 8 but not Axiom 9.
3 The Approach
3.1 Questionnaires
We used a standard technique to investigate whether this formulation of
polarisation is appropriatein that it corresponds with individualsviews.
The method follows that of earlier work on inequality, poverty and social
welfare (Amiel and Cowell 1992, 1999b).
The basic idea is to set up a number of income-distribution comparisons
and to invite respondents to state which of the two distributions represents
greater polarisation. So the approach is purely ordinal and, given an appro-
priate collection of income-distribution pairs, it is possible to get some insight
on whether the structures imposed by the axiomatisation are consistent with
the principles that underlie peoples perceptions of polarisation.
Of course, as in the inequality and other studies, we also need to check
on whether respondents are inuenced by the way questions are presented.
In the present case this takes two forms:
 Within a questionnaire we pose questions both in the form of specic
numerical problems and, later, also in terms of principles expressed
verbally.
 We used a variety of formats for the questionnaire concurrently. Since
the initial contributions to the polarisation literature appealed strongly
to individual intuition in establishing the concept it is clearly impor-
tant to use alternative representations in order to appeal to our re-
spondents intuition. Some respondents completed the questionnaire
on-line in an interactive environment, VLAB, established at the Distri-
butional Research Programme, of STICERD, LSE. Others completed
the questionnaire in the corresponding hardcopy form. Both versions
8See Esteban and Ray (1994) Theorem 3.
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were prepared in three forms of questionnaire that presented the nu-
merical representation in di¤erent ways, as follows.
1. With hints. The two distributions are presented as simple vectors,
written out in full. Where components di¤er between the two
income vectors these are highlighted in bold to emphasise to the
respondent what particular implied change in the distribution he
or she ought to be looking at.
2. No hints. As above, but without putting particular vector com-
ponents in bold.
3. Pictures. We use a simple graphic based on the usage in Amiel and
Cowell (1999b) to represent the two distributions on an income
line.
A number of variants of the questionnaires were used in order to examine
specic hypotheses  how these questionnaires di¤ered from one another
is explained in section 6. The questionnaires themselves are available at
http://darp.lse.ac.uk/polarisation/ and the master version used for reference
in this paper is reprinted in Appendix C. It is important to note that this
master version was not the one used for the bulk of our respondents: the
versions used in the initial phase with our main sample (reported in section
5) were slightly shorter, omitting questions 11, 12 and 22.
3.2 Axioms and questions
Many of the questions to be addressed concern the extent to which respon-
dentsviews correspond to individual axioms or principles employed in the
polarisation literature. The relationship between the question used in our
study, the Axioms set out in section 2.1 and other properties highlighted in
Esteban and Ray (1994) are given in Table 1. If a substantial proportion of
respondents answer questions in a way that is systematically di¤erent from
the entry on the right-hand side of the table, there is prima facie reason to
call into question the corresponding axiom or principle.
Are there specic principles in Table 1 that should be of special interest
as being central to the idea of polarisation? Perhaps the two most important
issues are:
 Axioms 1 and 6. Axiom 6 explicitly demonstrates that polarisation
and inequality are two di¤erent concepts(Chakravarty and Majumdar
2001, p.6); furthermore it appears to capture a similar idea to Axiom
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Axiom Answers consistent with axiom
Axiom 1 11B, 12B, 22B
Axiom 2 6B, 18A
Axiom 3 7B, 19A
Axiom 4 8B, 20A
Axiom 5 1A, 9A, 7B, 10A, 13aC, 13bB, 21A
Axiom 6 2A, 14B
Axiom 7 3AB, 15C
Axiom 8 4AB, 5A, 16A, 17A
Axiom 9 5AB, 4B, 17B, 16B
Relevance of isolated ind. (Esteban and Ray 1994) 1AB, 13aB, 13bC
Non-monotonicity (Esteban and Ray 1994) 1B, 9B, 10A, 21D
Table 1: Axioms and questions
1 as well as being related to Esteban and Rays discussion of the be-
haviour of P under progressive transfers (p.844). An important issue
is whether Axiom 6 can be taken as just a more general form of Axiom
1: this question is examined formally in Appendix A and its empirical
implications in section 6.2.
 The non-monotonic behaviour attributed to polarisation (Esteban and
Ray 1994). Non-monotonicity is potentially important for at least two
reasons. First, it clashes with Axiom 5 (described by Chakravarty and
Majumdar (2001) as a monotonicity property). Now, if Esteban and
Rays measure does not satisfy this property it could be an indication
as to whether Esteban and Rays measure is preferred to the others, say
Chakravarty andMajumdars. Second, it can provide some insight as to
whether lay people give more importance to intergroup di¤erencesor
to within group homogeneity,which in turn drive Esteban and Rays
model (i.e. alienation and identication).
In discussing the intermediate behaviourof their measure Esteban and
Ray (1994) show that if initial polarisation is relatively large then as popu-
lation moves away from two central masses, to the extremes, polarisation as
measured by P rst decreases and then increases.9 Such a transition is cap-
tured by question 9 where initial polarisation is large as in Esteban and Ray
9See their Figures 5 and 6 (Esteban and Ray 1994 p. 848) : the interesting transition
in Figure 5 (our Figure 1) is from panels (a) to (b).
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(1994). Therefore, we can check whether respondents are giving coherent or
consistent answers by checking whether their answers comply with the three
axioms used in Theorem 1 of Esteban and Ray (1994) while also answering
that polarisation should not be monotonic in situations such as that depicted
in Figure 1. In terms of our questions this implies the following sequence:
Axiom 1 ! 11B, 12B (22B)
Axiom 2 ! 6B (18A)
Axiom 3 ! 7B (19A)
Nonmonotonicity in Figure 1 ! 1B, 9B, 10A (21D)
1084 620
1084 6201084 620
(b)(a)
(c)
Figure 1: Nonmonotonicity in polarisation
3.3 Relations among axioms
We can do more than examine individual principles using the questionnaire-
experimental approach. The proportion of the sample who simultaneously
give the responses listed in rows 1 3 of Table 1 can be taken as an indication
of the extent to which individuals intuit polarisation in a manner consistent
with Esteban and Ray (1994)s polarisation index, P given in equation (2).
Likewise the proportion of the sample who, in addition to the above, also
give the responses of row 4 can be taken as an indication of the extent to
which polarisation is perceived in the narrower form of P with   1.10
10This means that sensitivity parameter is su¢ ciently large that P is not close to an
inequality index (Gini dened on log incomes) see Esteban and Ray (1994) Theorem 3.
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In addition the proportion of the sample who respond in line with rows
5, 6, 7 of Table 1 can be taken as an indication of the extent of support
for the P I index (1) suggested by Chakravarty and Majumdar (2001).
3.4 Additional checks
We also check on symmetry regarding the constituent parts (a) and (b)
Axiom 5, using questions 13a and 13b. It may also be thought that the
arguments given in the options of the verbal questions could drive individuals
towards the rightanswer. To check that, we also ran some questionnaires
with bare verbal answers, i.e. increase, decrease, remains the same.
4 The Samples
The questionnaire-experiments reported here consisted of a main study and
two follow-up investigations.
4.1 Main study
Our main sample consisted of 1521 students from eleven universities spread
amongst six countries, which we use for the main study, and two smaller
samples that we use to test several hypothesis or conjectures which arose
from the analysis of the main sample. The three samples are shown in Table
2. Average age in the main sample is 22, and the gender composition is fairly
equally balanced. Most of them are economics and business students but we
also sampled students from other social sciences, and to a lesser extent from
other disciplines. Notice that the distribution of the type of questionnaire is
also balanced, with the pictorial version being slightly more used than the
other two. Average political views lay in the mid-point of the support and,
on average, respondents expect to be nancially better-o¤ in ten yearstime
than were their families ten years ago.
4.2 Follow-up studies
As outlined above and explained in more detail in Section 6, to address
two specic issues that arose from the analysis of the main sample, we im-
plemented two follow-up studies with smaller samples. The rst follow-up
study uses two subsamples of 131 and 128 individuals who responded to two
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Main Follow-up study 1 Follow-up
study Polarisation Inequality study 2
Variable N val N val N val N val
Age 1445 22.11 128 20.45 118 19.94 183 22.45
Political views 1392 3.61 123 3.06 108 3.17 178 2.86
Family income in 1995 1425 4.09 125 3.89 112 4.03 181 4.02
Income prospects in 2015 1422 4.68 126 4.90 111 5.17 181 4.65
Gender 1449 128 116 183
Female 757 52.24 79 61.72 68 58.62 99 54.1
Male 692 47.76 49 38.28 48 41.38 84 45.9
Employed before university 1403 127 117 180
No 733 52.25 37 29.13 42 35.90 52 28.9
Yes 670 47.75 90 70.87 75 64.10 128 71.1
Subject of study 1478 131 128 191
Economics 632 42.76 51 38.93 48 37.5 46 25.6
Business 591 39.99 41 31.30 40 31.25 49 24.1
Social Sciences 175 11.84 39 29.77 40 31.25 96 50.3
Other 80 5.41 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Language of questionnaire
Catalan 550 36.16 131 100.00 128 100.00 191 100.00
English 363 23.87 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Spanish 608 39.97 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
University
LSE 83 5.46 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
UAB 343 23 131 100.00 128 100.00 191 100.00
UB 145 9.53 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
UEC 87 5.72 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
UHOB 60 3.94 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
UI 64 4.21 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
UMON 69 4.54 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
UOC 94 6.18 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
UR 185 12.16 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
URJC1 210 13.81 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
UV 181 11.9 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Type of Questionnaire
Hints 426 28.01 46 35.11 44 34.38 0 0.00
No Hints 454 29.85 45 34.35 42 32.81 0 0.00
Pictures 641 42.14 40 30.53 42 32.81 191 100.00
* Val gives m ean of relevant variab le or p ercentage w ith sp ecied characteristic
** London School of Econom ics, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Universitat de Barcelona, East Carolina University,
Hobart University, University of Istanbul, M onash University, Universitat Ob erta de Catalunya, Universidad de la
República , Universidad Rey Juan Carlos I, Universidad de V igo.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of our Sample
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parallel questionnaires, on inequality and polarisation, with the aim of .nd-
ing out whether respondents answer to polarisation questions as though they
are being presented with inequality questions the di¤erences between these
two questionnaires and the relationship to the one used in the main study are
explained in Section 6.1. The second follow-up study samples 191 individuals
to check whether the Increased Bipolarity property is an adequate proxy for
the ER1 axiom. The strategy of running two parallel questionnaires is also
used in this follow-up study, obtaining rather balanced subsamples.
The composition of the follow-up samples is very similar to the main
sample; however, they come from only one university (UAB) and the second
follow-up study uses only the picture-type questionnaire.
5 Results: a rst look
Let us examine the extent to which individualsperceptions of polarisation
accord to the axioms or features commonly used in the economics literature
and outlined above. We begin by reporting on the initial phase of our study
that used a shorter version of the questionnaire11 allowing the Increased
Bipolarity principle (Axiom 6) to proxy for the ER1 (Axiom 1). In the light
of the results from this initial phase two follow-up studies were carried out,
discussed in section 6. In order to follow the ordering of questions in the
questionnaire we shall report rst on Axioms 5 to 9, and then proceed with
the axioms used in Esteban and Ray (1994).
5.1 Axiom 5: Increased Spread
Question 1 (Q1) shows that there seems to be an overwhelming majority
that supports this property (60%) see Table 3. The corresponding verbal
questions 13a and 13b yield similar results (69% and 71%, respectively),
which is a clear sign of symmetry in the evaluation of (similar) changes when
occurring at di¤erent ends (or halves) of the distribution. That is, individuals
do not seem to give more importance to a given gapat the lower rather
than the upper half of the distribution.
The overwhelming evidence in favour of Axiom 5 remains when other
numerical questions (7, 9, 10) are used. Notwithstanding this, one should in-
terpret the evidence from these questions with caution. These three questions
11This can be generated by omitting questions 11, 12 and 22 from the master version in
Appendix C and renumbering
12
Question 1 Question 13a Question 13b Question 10
Increases 59.5 68.8 70.5 75.8
Same 6.1 12.0 11.0 8.9
Decreases 34.4 13.2 12.2 15.3
Depends 6.0 6.3
N 1507 1497 1486 1506
Note: Orthodoxanswers in italics
Table 3: Increased Spread
involve somewhat larger changes than question 1, and thus other properties
may be driving the answer. Take question 10. On the one hand, the transition
from distribution B to A should increase polarisation, according to Axiom
5 which is the answer we mostly get. On the other hand, however, one
should bear in mind that Q10 is moving the two poles further apart without
creating any dispersion around any of them, i.e. in Esteban and Ray (1994)s
terms, it increases alienation without introducing any loss in identication.
Question 1, instead, proposes a change in the income of only one individual,
thus implying a loss in identication and no increase in alienation.
5.2 Axiom 6: Increased Bipolarity
This property does not seem to enjoy much support, in whatever form the
issue is posed. This result is remarkable perhaps unfortunate because
the property provides a clear distinction between polarisation and inequal-
ity. As shown in Table 4, only 30% of the sample provides an answer to Q2
that is consistent with the axiom. This percentage falls to 20% in the verbal
question 14. Perhaps our representation of the property is too weak to trans-
mit the essence of the axiom in that respondents might consider that such
small changes do not make any di¤erence; 16% and 48% view the changes
proposed in Q2 and Q14, respectively, as having no e¤ect on polarisation.
Interestingly, the option enjoying the largest support is that an equalizing
transfer decreases polarisation. Our interpretation of this result is di¤erent
for the two questions. In the numerical question 2 this may be inuenced
by the lowest income in distribution B being smaller than the corresponding
one in distribution A (together with the fact that the transfer is small in
absolute terms). Such a result in Q2 could also arise because the equalizing
transfer implies a loss in identication (the pole at 10 loses one fourth of
its mass, and the movement does not generate another pole but creates a
somewhat blurred picture at the bottom end of the distribution). The rather
large support for a decrease in the verbal question 14, however, might be
13
Question 2 Question 14
Increases 30.1 19.7
Same 16.2 47.8
Decreases 53.7 32.5
N 1497 1441
Note: Orthodoxanswers in italics
Table 4: Increased Bipolarisation
due to a di¤erent reason. Our conjecture is that the suggested explanations
in the rst two options may trick the respondent. Put crudely, option a)
suggests that polarisation falls because a certain gap increases, while option
b) suggests that it has actually increased because the distance between two
individuals becomes smaller. Now, if individuals let these two distances drive
their answer, a likely outcome is concluding that polarisation has decreased.
In order to test such conjecture, we have used a version of the questionnaire
with bare verbal questions that is, without explanations and have used
regression analysis to test the (statistical) signicance of the variable that
identies this experimenti.e. that identify the questionnaires with bare
verbal answers. The answers given by this bare-verbal-questions sample
support this conjecture: now individuals do not favour the decreaseoption
as much (being now the decreaseanswer as popular as the increaseop-
tion) and tend to think instead that an equalising transfer leaves polarisation
unchanged see Table 24 in Appendix B.
As outlined above, Increased Bipolarity is about equalizing transfers, and
to the eyes of many such transfers decrease inequality (Amiel and Cowell
1992, 1999b). Thus, another possibility is that respondents be heavily in-
uenced by the notion of inequality when assessing the equalizing transfer
which takes place from distribution B to A in Q2 or when deciding about
the e¤ect of the rich-to-poor income transfer of Q14. We study this issue in
section 6.1:
Finally, from the answers to this question one could surmise that the level
of income of the poorest individual may have a large impact on a persons po-
larisation assessment. This conjecture also arises when trying to understand
the answers to some other questions.
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Question 3 Question 15
Increases 29.3 12.8
Same 57.1 82.9
Decreases 13.6 4.3
N 1496 1468
Note: Orthodoxanswers in italics
Table 5: Population Principle
5.3 Axiom 7: Population Principle
Table 5 shows that a large majority of the sample gives responses in line
with the population principle 57% and 83% in the numerical and the verbal
questions, respectively. Actually, the verbal question is more convincing or
persuasive than the numerical one (69% of those who did not answer in line
with the principle in the numerical question did so in the verbal one). Given
the above, it is no surprise that nearly everyone who answered in line with the
population principle in the numerical question 3 also answered in agreement
with the principle in Q15 (only 7% did not).
5.4 Scale or Translation Invariance?
Translation invariance looks like winning the contest here, though scale in-
variance does not enjoy little support, especially in the verbal question see
Table 6. In both cases, the verbal questions seem more persuasive than the
numerical ones. One could be suspicious of the short argument provided in
the di¤erent options as driving individuals to the answers that are consistent
with the axioms. However, the analysis of our bare-verbal-questionssam-
ple reveals it to be an unfounded suspicion. For instance, in the case of scale
invariance (Q14), the brief explanations seem to have the opposite e¤ect, so
that when explanations are dropped, increases (to 69%) the percentage of
respondents who agree with the axiom see Table 26 in Appendix B.
As far as the consistency between numerical and verbal questions is con-
cerned, both pairs of questions provide larger support for translation invari-
ance than for scale invariance. The cross-tab of questions 4 and 16 presented
in Table 7 shows that while only 21% consistently agree with scale invari-
ance, those answering in line with translation invariance represent 24% of
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Question 4 Question 5 Question 16 Question 17
Increases 61.5 18.0 30.3 6.7
Same 28.2 50.2 53.9 64.9
Decreases 10.3 31.8 10.8 20.7
Depends 5.0 7.6
N 1507 1497 1468 1466
Note: Answers consistent with scale invariance in italics;
answers consistent with translation invariance in bold
Table 6: Scale or Translation Invariance?
Question 16
Question 4 Increases Same Decreases Depends Total
Increases 24:1 27.8 6.9 2.9 61.7
Same 3.9 21.4 1.7 1.1 28.1
Decreases 2.2 4.8 2.1 1.0 10.2
Total 30.2 54.0 10.7 5.0 100
Question 17
Question 5 Increases Same Decreases Depends Total
Increases 2.8 9.6 3.5 1.9 17.8
Same 1.9 41.2 4.4 2.9 50.5
Decreases 2.0 14.3 12.6 2.8 31.7
Total 6.7 65.1 20.6 7.6 100
Note: Answers consistent with scale invariance in italics;
answers consistent with translation invariance in bold
Table 7: Scale or Translation Invariance? Consistency between Numerical
and Verbal Answers
the sample. On the other hand, as much as 41% do consistently respond in
line with translation invariance in questions 5 and 17.
When the answers to both numerical questions (4 and 5) are simultane-
ously analysed, a smaller percentage of the sample gives consistent responses
to either of the postulates. Still, as Table 8 shows, translation invariance
continues to gather more support than scale invariance 32% and 10%, re-
spectively. As pointed out above, answers to both verbal questions provide
large support for both properties. Hence, when the two verbal questions 16
and 17 are cross-checked, fewer individuals than before with the numerical
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Question 5
Question 4 Increases Same Decreases Total
Increases 11.5 32.0 17.9 61.4
Same 2.8 15.2 10.3 28.3
Decreases 3.7 3.1 3.6 10.3
Total 18.0 50.3 31.7 100
Question 17
Question 16 Increases Same Decreases Depends Total
Increases 2.3 18.2 7.5 2.4 30.3
Same 3.3 39.5 8.5 2.5 53.8
Decreases 0.9 5.1 3.4 1.5 10.9
Depends 0.3 2.2 1.3 1.2 5.0
Total 6.7 64.9 20.8 7.7 100
Note: Answers consistent with scale invariance in italics;
answers consistent with translation invariance in bold
Table 8: Scale or Translation Invariance? Consistency Across Questions
questions provide consistent support for either of the two axioms (8% and
18%, respectively). Interestingly, the most popular response that arises from
the cross-tab of the two verbal questions (39%) is in line with the property
being tested by each question. Such a pattern is not so important in the
numerical questions though it is the third most populated option, behind
the consistent answers to the two properties.
5.5 Axioms 2 and 3: ER2 and ER3
Now consider axioms 2 and 3. Both of them receive overwhelming support
from our sample respondents. A look at the responses to each question
reveals that in both cases more than 65% of the respondents answer in line
with the axiom being tested. Moreover, more than half of the whole sample
provides consistent answers to the numerical and verbal questions.
5.6 Axiom 4: ER4
Axiom 4 receives somewhat less support see Table 10. No more than 40%
of the respondents provides a response in line with this axiom in both the
17
Axiom 2 Axiom 3
Question 6 Question 18 Question 7 Question 19
Increases 71.8 65.8 76.9 67.4
Same 8.3 10.3 5.8 15.2
Decreases 19.9 15.1 17.3 8.6
Depends 8.9 8.7
N 1506 1460 1506 1458
Note: Orthodoxanswers in italics
Table 9: Axioms 2 and 3
Question 8 Question 20
Increases 38.9 27.4
Same 3.1 9.6
Decreases 58.1 63.0
N 1507 1439
Note: Orthodoxanswers in italics
Table 10: Axiom 4
numerical and verbal questions, and only one sixth agrees with the axiom
in both questions simultaneously. In fact, when cross-checking the responses
from the numerical and the verbal questions, consistent rejection of the axiom
is the option that gathers the largest support (44%). The importance-of-
the-income-of-the-poorest-individuale¤ect outlined above could be an ex-
planation. Note that in the verbal question 20 our justication or ex-
planationfor a decrease (option b) is that the lowest income group disap-
pears; and when explanations are dropped from the answers, the decrease
response loses strength: 15 percentage points that could be attributed to the
importance-of-the-income-of-the-poorest-individuale¤ect. Furthermore, in
the numerical question 8, the poorest group in distribution A could be iden-
tied with individuals belonging to the richest one in distribution B.
5.7 On the relevance of isolated individuals
Consider now the issue of whether small groups or isolated individuals are
insignicant in terms of polarisation compare panels (a) and (b) in Figure
2.12 The message that comes out of the answers to questions 1, 13a and
12This is taken from Figure 3 in Esteban and Ray (1994).
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13b shown in Table 3 seems to be clear-cut: few individuals do make a
di¤erence. Notwithstanding this, notice that 1 individual in 10 can be viewed
as substantial part of society if seen as being 10% of the population or as
an isolated individual if interpreted from the absolute perspective. Likewise,
in the verbal question few is certainly not very few, which admittedly
would capture rather better the essence of what an isolated individualis.
(b)(a)
Figure 2: Insignicance of small groups
5.8 Non-monotonicity
Esteban and Ray (1994) argue that in Figure 113 polarisation does not behave
monotonically as population moves to the extremes from two central masses,
and provided that initial polarisation is rather large. The reported support
for the Axiom 5 above implies that the support for this feature should be
rather weak. Indeed this is what we nd. The interesting transition in Figure
1  from panels (a) to (b)  is captured by our question 9. Since there is
no ground to allow for polarisation to decrease in the transition from panels
(b) to (c), a non-monotonic behaviour implies that people should perceive a
decrease in polarisation in the transformation going from panels (a) to (b).
Now, only about one third of the sample considers that such a transformation
implies a decrease in polarisation see Table 11. Additional evidence in the
same direction is provided by the responses to the same question 1 which was
used to analyse peoples support for Axiom 5 (Increased Spread). Here, again
only about one third of the sample considers that a small outward movement
away from one of the poles decreases polarisation. The verbal question 21 also
tackles this point. The responses in favour of non-monotonicity amount to a
mere 32% of the sample monotonicity attracting more than half of the whole
sample. Cross-checking the responses to questions 9 and 21 shows complete
13This is their Figure 5 (p.828).
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Question 9 Question 21
Increases 56.2 Increases always 42.5
Same 6.7 Decreases always 8.5
Decreases 37.1 Increases rst, then decreases 12.1
Decreases rst, then increases 20.3
Same 9.5
None 7.1
N 1498 N 1415
Note: Orthodoxanswers in italics
Table 11: Non-Monotonicity in Figure 5
consistency between the numerical and the verbal questions. Finally, adding
the responses to question 1 halves the above support to 5%.
6 Polarisation and inequality
It is clear that the results on polarisation perceptions, particularly those
reported in section 5.2, warrant a more detailed study. If respondents appear
to reject the principle of Increased Bipolarity then this is an issue that cannot
be just lightly set aside. There appear to be two main questions arising
from this result: (a) Do people respond to polarisation questions as though
they were being presented with issues in inequality? (b) Is it inappropriate
to see the Increased Bipolarity principle as a proxy for the ER1 principle?
To address these questions we carried out two follow-up studies that are
discussed in Sections 6.1 and 6.2.
6.1 Do respondents think in terms of inequality?
Our ndings suggest that important axioms which serve to di¤erentiate po-
larisation from inequality e.g. Increased Bipolarity as well as other dis-
tinctive features of polarisation, i.e. the non-monotonic behaviour attributed
to polarisation, are not widely accepted. Moreover, the answers obtained are
those to be expected in the neighbouring eld of inequality. These ndings
may indicate that respondents think in terms of inequality when answer-
ing our polarisation questionnaire. We investigated whether this is so by
running a small follow-up experiment, which consists of using two parallel
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Responses in both questionnaires...
... ought to ... actually
Coincide Di¤er
Coincide I II
Di¤er III IV
Table 12: Combinations of actual and expected answers in the polarisation
and inequality questionnaires
questionnaires, one on polarisation and another one on inequality. The lat-
ter, results from replacing the word polarisation with inequality in the bare-
verbal questionsversion of the polarisation questionnaire (and adapting the
introductory text).
To assess whether respondents think in terms of inequality when answer-
ing the polarisation questionnaire, we compare responses between the two
samples; the full details of the comparative study are provided in Appendix
B. As Table 12 shows, actual and expected responses can either coincide
or di¤er between questionnaires. When disagreement between expectations
and realisations (cells II and III in Table 12) occurs because polarisation re-
sponses are not in line with the relevant axiom but inequality responses are,
we will consider that respondents think in terms of inequality when answer-
ing the polarisation questionnaire.14 Responses that fall in cell IV, however,
may reveal that individuals are indeed thinking di¤erently in each question-
naire.15 Finally, notice that no information can be elicited from cell I, which
describes the situation where responses ought to and indeed coincide in both
questionnaires.
As shown in Table 13,16 expected answers di¤er in 40% of the questions,
and most notably in those referring to Axiom 6 (Increased Bipolarity) (ques-
14Note that disagreement between expected and actual responses may also arise because
inequality responses are not in line with the axiom and polarisation responses are, or
because both inequality and polarisation responses are not in line with the respective
relevant axioms. These two instances however do not provide any relevant information.
15That is, if answers di¤er because they are in line with the axiom. The case where
answers happen to di¤er, but only because some of the responses do not accord with the
relevant axiom does not provide any relevant information.
16In most cases the expected answer comes from adapting the polarisation axiom which
is being tested to the case of inequality. Scale and translation invariance of questions 4,
16, 5 and 17 are good examples of this. When this is does not apply, the expected answer
uses the Principle of transfers. Only in the case of four questions have we appealed to
stochastic dominance. In questions 6 and 18, distribution B generalised-Lorenz dominates
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tions 2 and 14) and to the non-monotonic behaviour of polarisation (questions
9 and 21). The answers obtained in question 2 may suggest that individuals
think in terms of inequality when answering the polarisation questionnaire.
Answers to this question ought to be di¤erent but, as shown in the appendix
table 24, they are actually very similar (cell III ): in both questionnaires more
than half of the respondents choose distribution B as the most polarised or
unequal. Notwithstanding that, responses to the companion verbal question
14 do not go in the same direction, and thus cast doubt on the robustness of
the previous conclusion.
The responses to questions 9 and 21 also provide inconclusive evidence.
Answers to question 9 should di¤er between both questionnaires. On the one
hand, and according to the principle of transfers, distribution A should be
more unequal, while the non-monotonic behaviour of polarisation would re-
quire distribution B to showmore polarisation. Respondents to the inequality
questionnaire do answer in line with the principle of transfers, but on the po-
larisation side both distributions gather similar support the di¤erence in ap-
pendix table 29 not being statistically signicant (z = 4:2; p value < 0:001)
 , and support for distribution A is not as strong as it is among inequal-
ity respondents. Answers to the companion verbal question 21 give support
to the possibility that polarisation-questionnaire respondents think in terms
of inequality: irrespective of the questionnaire type the option that receives
most support is that of a monotonic increase, consistent with inequality pos-
tulates but not with the non-monotonicity feature of polarisation. However,
this conclusion is worth qualifying since the di¤erence between monotonicity
and non-monotonicity is much smaller in the polarisation sample than in the
inequality sample.
Questions 6 and 18 are an interesting case, which suggests that respon-
dents do not think in terms of inequality when confronted with the polarisa-
tion questions. Responses in both questionnaires are in line with Axiom 2,
thus being clearly at odds with the (demanding) set of axioms required by
the generalised Lorenz dominance criteria. However, responses to questions 8
and 20 are consistent with the hypothesis that individuals do think in terms
of inequality.
6.2 Increased Bipolarity a closer look
Our second response to the problem raised by the lack of support for the key
Increased Bipolarity principle is to distinguish more sharply between Axiom
distribution A, while in questions 8 and 20 distribution B Lorenz dominates distribution
A.
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Expected answer in...
Q polarisation inequality Q polarisation inequality
1 A A 13a C C
2 A B 13b B B
3 AB AB 14 B A
4 AB AB 15 C C
5 AB AB 16 A A
6 B A 17 B B
7 B B 18 A B
8 B A 19 A A
9 B A 20 A B
10 A A 21 D A
Table 13: Expected answers in the polarisation and inequality questionnaires
1 and Axiom 6. This was done by presenting a sample of 191 students with
the inequality and polarisation versions of the questionnaire in Appendix C
and comparing the results of questions 2 and 14 on the one hand with those
of questions 11, 12 and 22 on the other.
Our analyses on the new sample conrm the weak support for Axiom
6 obtained with previous samples, but provide some evidence in support of
Axiom 1.17 Thus, people seem to appreciate the di¤erences between the two
axioms.
As regards the new evidence on Axiom 1, the polarisation subsample
(ca. 100 new respondents) answer questions 11 and 12 in accordance with
Axiom 1 nearly 50% of the respondents report that the pooling of the two
small population masses increases polarisation  see Table 14. Moreover,
the symmetry in the answers to questions 11 and 12 reveals support for a
possible extension of Axiom 1 to include pooling on the lower income rungs,
since strictly speaking, only question 11 provides a faithful representation of
Axiom 1 i.e. pooling of the masses on the upper income rungs.18
As pointed out above, Axioms 1 and 6 are key principles that distinguish
the concepts of polarisation and inequality their characterisation of a change
in income distribution are, in a sense, in direct opposition to that the principle
of transfers. Hence, it is worth noting that the respondents to the inequality
questionnaire, provide answers to questions 11 and 12 which are consistent
with the principle of transfers.
17The new follow-up sample provides answers to questions 2 and 14 which are very
similar to those obtained with the other two samples see Section 5.2.
18Though Axiom 1 gathers reasonable support for each of the two questions 11 and 12
separately, only 36% of respondents provide a consistent answer for both questions.
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Notwithstanding all this, the message coming from the answers to ques-
tion 22 is less clear-cut since the three choices obtain roughly speaking the
same (one third) support, irrespective of the type of questionnaire (polarisa-
tion or inequality).
Polarisation
Question 11 Question 12 Question 22
Increases 46.9 48.5 33.3
Same 17.4 23.7 34.4
Decreases 35.7 27.8 32.3
N 98 97 93
Inequality
Question 11 Question 12 Question 22
Increases 15.0 23.7 24.1
Same 26.9 34.4 37.9
Decreases 58.1 41.9 38.0
N 93 93 87
Note: Orthodoxanswers in italics
Table 14: Responses on questions dealing with Axiom ER1
6.3 Axioms required by polarisation indices
Only a minor proportion of the sample seems to endorse all the axioms
required to build the most popular indices in the literature. The three axioms
used in Theorem 1 in Esteban and Ray (1994) (questions 11, 6 and 7) gather
39% of support. When Axiom 4 is also considered having thus the four
axioms required to arrive at the preferred measure in Esteban and Ray (1994),
theorem 3 support goes down to 23%. As far as Chakravarty and Majumdar
(2001) is concerned, we can only test for three of the six axioms used in their
Proposition 1  questions 1 to 3. None the less, our test on these three
axioms provides little support. Hence, proposition 1 is very likely to enjoy
very little support.Finally, consistency of the responses is virtually zero if
tested by means of checking whether their answers comply with the three
axioms used in Esteban and Ray (1994) (Theorem 1) to derive P and the
property that polarisation should not be monotonic in situations such as that
posed in Figure 1.19
19This result is obtained when the non-monotonicity in Figure 1 is assessed by means
of three numerical questions (1, 9 and 10) and verbal question 21, which is a rather
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7 What a¤ects polarisation perceptions?
Are individual characteristics or circumstances, such as the country of res-
idence or parental income, important to understand the perception people
have of polarisation? Or is it rather (the result of) certain individual choices
like the subject of study what drive their perceptions? Maybe it is nothing
to do with them but to their responses to di¤erent ways of eliciting their
perceptions, such as the way questions are posed or presented or the means
used to do so (i.e. on paper or virtually and by Internet).
In order to examine the extent to which reported polarisation perceptions
depend on all those aspects, we followed a fourfold strategy. We asked all
respondents to give us some basic information about themselves, we have
run the questionnaire in six countries and in three di¤erent languages, we
posed numerical and verbal questions, and nally we have also employed
three versions of the questionnaire. We investigate what a¤ects polarisation
perceptions by means of multinomial regressions one for each of the nineteen
questions. Relative risk ratio estimates are shown in Tables 15 to 22.20
The way questions are presented some times inuences polarisation per-
ceptions. As pointed out above in the analysis of the axioms, the relationship
between the answers given to numerical and verbal questions is rather loose
for many questions. None the less, most times such (quantitative) discrepan-
cies do not alter the qualitative conclusion. Perhaps not surprisingly, the way
numerical questions are presented with hints, with no hints, or by means
of pictures seems to inuence the answers to some numerical questions. In-
terestingly, the type of questionnaire has a signicant impact on the answers
to the questions related to the axioms that receive the least support, i.e.
questions 2 (Axiom 6), 4 (Axiom 9), 8 (Axiom 4), and 9 (Non-monotonicity
feature). Take increased bipolarity; respondents answering the pictorial ver-
sion of the questionnaire are twice as likely to agree with the axiom than
those who answered either of the two non-pictorial versions; but even among
those who had the pictorial version those who responded in accordance with
the axiom were in a minority (37%). They are also more than twice as likely
to reject scale invariance in favour of reporting larger polarisation as the
income gap between two poles remains constant in relative but increases in
absolute terms. On the contrary, individuals who answered a questionnaire
with no visual hints behave the opposite way. That is, they are twice as likely
to reject scale invariance in favour of reporting smaller polarisation when the
demanding condition. The same result obtains if only the verbal question is used to assess
the non monotonous behaviour of polarisation. However, when this condition is relaxed
to the numerical questions only, support increases to 13%.
20Estimates are obtained using the main sample only.
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income gap between two poles remains constant in relative but increases in
absolute terms (question 4).
As explained above, translation invariance is favoured over scale invari-
ance. The regression estimates on question 5 reveal that those who faced the
pictorial version of the questionnaire are twice as likely to give support to
the translation invariance axiom than to reporting a decrease in polarisation
as the income gap increases in absolute terms but decreases in relative ones.
Amongst those who reject Axiom 4, the questionnaire with no visual hints
seems to induce individuals to think that the position of intermediate poles
matter for polarisation. Finally, both questionnaires with pictures and no
hints have a positive impact on the likelihood that the non-monotonic be-
haviour of polarisation in the transition of two poles getting closer or further
apart be shared.
The type of questionnaire a¤ects also the answer to questions that test
axioms which gather large support. For instance, individuals who answered
to pictorial version of the questionnaire are also more likely to agree with
Axiom 2 than those who used the questionnaire with visual hints. In sum,
inuence of the type of questionnaire on perceptions does not show any sys-
tematic pattern; in particular, for some questions the pictorial version of the
questionnaire seems to exert an inuence in line with the axiom, while for
some other questions the inuence goes in the opposite direction. Moreover,
the presentation of the numerical questions also seems to inuence the an-
swer to some verbal questions which, recall, are identical across type of
questionnaire.
Some of our respondents answered the questionnaire by internet using the
Virtual Lab. The advantages of the Virtual Lab are many, but we should
make sure that it does not systematically a¤ect individual perceptions. In-
deed, this is the overall conclusion which could be drawn from our multino-
mial estimates since the internet variable is only signicant for some few
cases.
Previous studies show that when it comes to reporting ones perceptions
to distributive concepts such as inequality or poverty cultural background
matters (Amiel and Cowell 1992, 1999b). We capture cultural di¤erences by
the subject of study and the country/language in which the questionnaire
was run. Instruction in economics matters for one of the important axioms
that gathered little support, increased bipolarity. As compared to individuals
being taught other social sciences, economics students are far more inclined
to think in accordance with the axiom, instead of reporting that an equalising
transfer decreases polarisation. However, when answering question 16 to
test scale and translation invariance  , social science students are more
likely to answer against both axioms. Here, social science students may be
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inuenced (more than other students) by the poverty-related explanation
provided in the answer choice where it is suggested that doubling incomes
may cover basic needs of low-income groups. Students from other disciplines
are also more inclined than economics students to give answers that are not
consistent with the axioms (questions 1, 3, 6, 9, 10).
In order to examine the inuence of societies and the common features
of their culture on individual perceptions of polarisation we have dened a
variable which is a combination of the language used and the place the
questionnaire was run  that identies Catalan, Spanish, Anglo-Saxon in
England, the US and Australia, Uruguayan and Turkish. Students belonging
to these cultures do not respond di¤erently to the numerical questions that
test the axioms that receive the least support (e.g. questions 2, 4, 8 and
9). As concerns the verbal questions, the most remarkable feature is the
persistency of the Turkish respondents in providing answers that di¤er from
those of the other groups.
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orthodoxanswer A A AB AB AB
Question 1 2 3 4 5
RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value
AB A A A A
Age 1.07 0.02 1.02 0.30 0.97 0.29 0.99 0.63 1.03 0.07
Male 0.68 0.13 1.13 0.37 1.15 0.45 0.90 0.63 1.80 0.00
Employed 0.73 0.25 1.28 0.08 1.69 0.01 1.80 0.01 1.08 0.60
Subject study
Business 1.39 0.31 0.97 0.84 1.55 0.07 1.39 0.22 1.21 0.28
Social Sciences 0.91 0.83 0.58 0.02 1.50 0.20 0.83 0.65 1.23 0.36
Other 0.76 0.74 0.58 0.11 2.98 0.01 2.88 0.01 1.12 0.76
Language
English 1.43 0.38 1.39 0.14 4.26 0.00 2.02 0.02 1.84 0.01
Spanish 1.03 0.93 1.41 0.07 1.14 0.62 0.76 0.39 0.90 0.60
Uruguayan 0.97 0.95 1.32 0.24 1.61 0.17 0.92 0.85 1.67 0.03
English (Turkey) 0.41 0.41 0.95 0.88 5.48 0.00 0.37 0.35 1.77 0.09
Version
No Hints 1.01 0.97 1.09 0.63 1.28 0.30 1.82 0.03 1.09 0.61
Pictures 2.34 0.01 1.85 0.00 1.16 0.52 1.31 0.31 0.46 0.00
Internet 0.86 0.82 1.03 0.94 1.06 0.91 1.32 0.62 0.59 0.18
Political view
Centre 1.11 0.75 0.98 0.93 1.07 0.78 1.37 0.29 0.88 0.46
Right 1.08 0.85 1.08 0.72 1.12 0.71 0.99 0.99 0.88 0.55
Income parents
Middle 0.94 0.85 1.30 0.13 1.39 0.17 1.02 0.95 0.98 0.91
High 1.13 0.75 1.39 0.11 1.09 0.77 1.22 0.54 0.98 0.92
Mobility prospects
Same as parents 1.14 0.73 1.10 0.63 0.78 0.36 1.50 0.18 0.91 0.64
Better than parents 1.07 0.86 1.37 0.13 0.88 0.64 1.10 0.77 0.77 0.20
Reference group: female, not employed , stud ies econom ics, answers catalan questionnaire w ith
h ints on pap er, p olitica lly left, w ith low incom e parents and exp ecting to do worse than them .
The comparison answer is a lways the most frequent one.
Table 15: E¤ect of individual characteristics on answers to questions 1 to 5.
Relative Risk Ratios (part 1)
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orthodoxanswer A A AB AB AB
Question 1 2 3 4 5
RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value
B AB B AB B
Age 1.04 0.03 1.02 0.32 0.96 0.04 0.99 0.65 1.02 0.30
Male 0.98 0.86 1.09 0.59 1.02 0.86 1.16 0.26 0.97 0.86
Employed 0.82 0.14 1.20 0.30 1.35 0.04 0.89 0.44 1.35 0.08
Subject study
Business 1.54 0.01 1.23 0.34 1.30 0.14 0.56 0.00 1.26 0.26
Social Sciences 1.45 0.08 0.70 0.21 1.55 0.05 0.71 0.13 1.02 0.94
Other 3.85 0.00 0.29 0.02 2.61 0.01 0.94 0.87 1.64 0.19
Language
English 1.20 0.41 1.17 0.56 4.04 0.00 0.79 0.30 2.78 0.00
Spanish 1.40 0.06 0.79 0.34 1.66 0.01 1.11 0.58 1.51 0.07
Uruguayan 1.38 0.15 1.23 0.47 1.82 0.01 0.77 0.28 1.21 0.55
English (Turkey) 2.54 0.00 0.67 0.40 6.24 0.00 1.19 0.59 0.99 0.98
Version
No Hints 1.25 0.19 0.73 0.17 1.20 0.34 1.25 0.18 1.09 0.68
Pictures 1.41 0.03 1.17 0.44 1.37 0.06 0.49 0.00 0.77 0.19
Internet 0.70 0.33 1.24 0.62 1.12 0.77 1.32 0.47 0.83 0.68
Political view
Centre 1.42 0.05 1.24 0.35 1.10 0.60 1.12 0.52 1.00 0.99
Right 1.41 0.11 1.40 0.23 0.96 0.87 1.04 0.88 1.06 0.84
Income parents
Middle 1.10 0.55 0.91 0.68 1.01 0.98 1.25 0.19 0.75 0.16
High 0.96 0.86 1.02 0.95 0.98 0.93 1.07 0.75 0.78 0.31
Mobility prospects
Same as parents 1.09 0.66 1.13 0.63 0.74 0.13 1.49 0.05 1.34 0.26
Better than parents 1.06 0.76 1.05 0.86 0.74 0.15 1.39 0.11 1.05 0.86
Reference group: female, not employed , stud ies econom ics, answers catalan questionnaire w ith
h ints on pap er, p olitica lly left, w ith low incom e parents and exp ecting to do worse than them .
The comparison answer is a lways the most frequent one.
Table 16: E¤ect of individual characteristics on answers to questions 1 to 5
Relative Risk Ratios (part 2)
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orthodoxanswer B B B B A
Question 6 7 8 9 10
RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value
A A A AB AB
Age 0.90 0.00 0.94 0.01 1.05 0.22 1.00 0.88 1.01 0.76
Male 0.79 0.12 1.16 0.34 1.14 0.70 0.79 0.33 0.92 0.69
Employed 1.14 0.39 1.04 0.83 0.70 0.34 1.91 0.01 1.14 0.57
Subject study
Business 1.27 0.22 0.88 0.52 0.77 0.55 1.21 0.55 0.80 0.44
Social Sciences 1.69 0.04 0.81 0.47 1.04 0.95 0.90 0.82 1.12 0.76
Other 1.43 0.34 2.68 0.00 0.65 0.62 1.34 0.62 4.89 0.00
Language
English 1.18 0.51 1.46 0.13 1.97 0.17 1.71 0.16 0.94 0.87
Spanish 1.62 0.02 1.72 0.01 0.81 0.67 1.56 0.19 1.71 0.07
Uruguayan 0.72 0.29 0.93 0.81 0.46 0.29 0.90 0.82 0.66 0.32
English (Turkey) 3.10 0.00 0.43 0.13 1.79 0.42 1.62 0.47 2.36 0.06
Version
No Hints 0.70 0.06 1.03 0.87 2.05 0.14 0.88 0.72 1.14 0.68
Pictures 0.66 0.02 1.00 0.98 2.09 0.12 2.07 0.01 1.97 0.01
Internet 3.34 0.01 1.70 0.27 1.55 0.62 1.58 0.44 1.94 0.22
Political view
Centre 1.35 0.14 1.12 0.59 1.58 0.37 0.83 0.55 1.27 0.43
Right 0.91 0.70 0.72 0.22 1.16 0.82 0.74 0.45 1.27 0.51
Income parents
Middle 0.82 0.28 0.90 0.61 0.69 0.38 1.14 0.69 1.05 0.86
High 0.79 0.31 0.84 0.45 0.47 0.15 1.59 0.21 0.93 0.83
Mobility prospects
Same as parents 1.16 0.53 0.94 0.81 1.29 0.65 1.40 0.41 1.23 0.56
Better than parents 1.19 0.45 1.20 0.45 1.02 0.97 2.08 0.07 1.44 0.29
Reference group: female, not employed , stud ies econom ics, answers catalan questionnaire w ith
h ints on pap er, p olitica lly left, w ith low incom e parents and exp ecting to do worse than them .
The comparison answer is a lways the most frequent one.
Table 17: E¤ect of individual characteristics on answers to questions 6 to 10.
Relative Risk Ratios (part 1)
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orthodoxanswer B B B B A
Question 6 7 8 9 10
RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value
AB AB B B B
Age 0.96 0.17 0.95 0.11 1.04 0.01 1.03 0.04 0.97 0.24
Male 0.90 0.63 0.70 0.19 0.81 0.08 0.69 0.00 0.92 0.60
Employed 1.24 0.36 4.41 0.00 0.81 0.10 0.92 0.54 1.34 0.10
Subject study
Business 1.12 0.71 0.99 0.97 1.02 0.88 1.15 0.39 1.56 0.04
Social Sciences 0.76 0.53 1.10 0.83 0.97 0.87 1.43 0.08 1.25 0.48
Other 4.11 0.01 0.41 0.42 2.40 0.00 1.85 0.05 3.85 0.00
Language
English 0.75 0.49 0.77 0.57 1.09 0.67 1.30 0.21 1.97 0.01
Spanish 1.02 0.95 1.20 0.60 1.27 0.17 1.14 0.45 1.49 0.09
Uruguayan 1.33 0.48 0.56 0.29 0.99 0.95 1.09 0.70 0.80 0.54
English (Turkey) 2.16 0.16 0.00 1.00 1.33 0.37 1.70 0.10 1.59 0.34
Version
No Hints 0.90 0.72 0.51 0.05 1.06 0.71 1.68 0.00 1.16 0.49
Pictures 0.76 0.31 0.60 0.10 1.11 0.50 1.57 0.00 0.83 0.37
Internet 4.92 0.00 4.84 0.01 1.31 0.42 0.60 0.17 1.93 0.14
Political view
Centre 1.48 0.22 1.28 0.48 1.05 0.77 0.81 0.19 1.05 0.83
Right 1.00 0.99 1.89 0.15 1.27 0.23 0.82 0.32 1.38 0.25
Income parents
Middle 1.18 0.58 0.73 0.35 0.91 0.53 0.85 0.32 0.99 0.95
High 1.17 0.66 0.87 0.72 0.90 0.58 0.67 0.03 0.70 0.17
Mobility prospects
Same as parents 1.39 0.29 1.05 0.89 1.15 0.45 1.22 0.29 1.26 0.37
Better than parents 0.95 0.89 0.93 0.85 1.03 0.86 0.99 0.97 1.03 0.90
Reference group: female, not employed , stud ies econom ics, answers catalan questionnaire w ith
h ints on pap er, p olitica lly left, w ith low incom e parents and exp ecting to do worse than them .
The comparison answer is a lways the most frequent one.
Table 18: E¤ect of individual characteristics on answers to questions 6 to 10.
Relative Risk Ratios (part 2)
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OrthodoxAnswer C B C A B
Question 13 14 15 16 17
RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value
a a a b a
Age 1.01 0.59 0.99 0.74 0.98 0.39 1.02 0.26 1.02 0.21
Male 1.34 0.09 2.20 0.00 1.37 0.07 1.68 0.00 2.19 0.00
Employed 1.01 0.97 1.03 0.86 1.01 0.96 0.95 0.72 1.08 0.65
Subject study
Business 1.06 0.81 0.88 0.45 0.86 0.51 1.16 0.39 1.14 0.51
Social Sciences 0.82 0.53 0.97 0.88 0.92 0.79 0.90 0.63 1.37 0.20
Other 2.02 0.10 0.34 0.00 1.64 0.23 0.73 0.36 0.52 0.08
Language
English 1.06 0.84 1.57 0.04 1.00 1.00 1.12 0.60 2.73 0.00
Spanish 1.22 0.41 0.68 0.04 1.09 0.73 0.75 0.13 0.69 0.10
Uruguayan 1.03 0.92 0.87 0.57 0.83 0.57 0.88 0.58 1.50 0.13
English (Turkey) 0.99 0.99 1.93 0.08 2.80 0.01 0.94 0.89 0.95 0.92
Version
No Hints 0.93 0.78 1.02 0.91 0.67 0.10 0.66 0.02 1.31 0.17
Pictures 1.67 0.02 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.89 0.86 0.34 0.80 0.23
Internet 1.61 0.29 0.85 0.68 1.39 0.52 1.78 0.13 0.36 0.04
Political view
Centre 1.28 0.31 0.78 0.16 0.93 0.76 0.89 0.49 1.09 0.66
Right 1.44 0.21 0.63 0.04 0.77 0.37 1.20 0.41 0.84 0.49
Income parents
Middle 1.28 0.29 1.08 0.66 1.39 0.16 0.63 0.01 0.82 0.32
High 0.99 0.98 1.17 0.46 1.59 0.09 1.07 0.73 0.88 0.59
Mobility prospects
Same as parents 0.89 0.67 0.82 0.32 0.62 0.07 1.05 0.81 1.74 0.02
Better than parents 0.92 0.75 0.88 0.53 1.06 0.82 0.97 0.90 1.26 0.36
Reference group: female, not employed , stud ies econom ics, answers catalan questionnaire w ith h ints on pap er, p olitica lly
left, w ith low incom e parents and exp ecting to do worse than them . The comparison answer is a lways the most frequent one.
Note: answers (d) have not b een considered in the ab ove multinom ial regressions
Table 19: E¤ect of individual characteristics on answers to questions 13 to
17. Relative Risk Ratios (part 1)
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OrthodoxAnswer C B C A B
Question 13 14 15 16 17
RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR
b b b c c
Age 1.04 0.08 0.99 0.72 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.90 0.97
Male 0.98 0.91 1.38 0.05 1.40 0.25 1.98 0.00 1.65
Employed 0.75 0.15 1.29 0.14 0.88 0.67 0.94 0.78 1.71
Subject study
Business 1.52 0.11 1.23 0.34 3.62 0.00 2.44 0.00 0.79
Social Sciences 0.84 0.56 0.70 0.22 2.25 0.16 2.48 0.01 0.95
Other 2.28 0.06 0.98 0.95 7.12 0.00 1.56 0.32 1.81
Language
English 1.29 0.42 2.54 0.00 0.95 0.92 1.64 0.12 2.29
Spanish 0.78 0.38 0.94 0.81 0.45 0.07 0.55 0.04 1.16
Uruguayan 3.46 0.00 2.65 0.00 1.08 0.90 0.71 0.41 2.54
English (Turkey) 0.92 0.89 2.74 0.03 7.50 0.00 5.87 0.00 7.91
Version
No Hints 0.70 0.16 1.30 0.24 0.98 0.96 1.18 0.53 1.56
Pictures 0.80 0.33 1.44 0.08 0.87 0.70 0.89 0.67 0.87
Internet 1.27 0.63 1.23 0.63 1.33 0.69 1.87 0.23 2.11
Political view
Centre 1.19 0.50 0.94 0.79 1.32 0.53 1.27 0.41 1.50
Right 1.73 0.07 0.88 0.64 0.91 0.86 1.89 0.07 1.70
Income parents
Middle 0.80 0.36 0.99 0.98 1.40 0.37 0.76 0.28 0.83
High 0.92 0.77 1.34 0.24 1.34 0.52 0.72 0.30 0.65
Mobility prospects
Same as parents 1.05 0.87 0.67 0.09 1.16 0.76 0.83 0.54 0.74
Better than parents 0.99 0.98 0.70 0.14 2.01 0.14 0.96 0.90 0.81
Reference group: female, not employed , stud ies econom ics, answers catalan questionnaire w ith h ints on pap er, p olitica lly
left, w ith low incom e parents and exp ecting to do worse than them . The comparison answer is a lways the most frequent one.
Note: answers (d) have not b een considered in the ab ove multinom ial regressions
Table 20: E¤ect of individual characteristics on answers to questions 13 to
17. Relative Risk Ratios (part 2)
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OrthodoxAnswer A A A B
Question 18 19 20 21
RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value
b b a b
Age 0.94 0.03 0.96 0.22 1.04 0.04 0.98 0.32
Male 0.69 0.03 1.31 0.23 1.10 0.47 0.76 0.04
Employed 1.03 0.85 0.83 0.43 0.90 0.49 0.98 0.86
Subject study
Business 0.82 0.35 3.05 0.00 0.78 0.16 1.16 0.39
Social Sciences 0.75 0.35 1.16 0.75 0.97 0.88 1.30 0.23
Other 1.26 0.57 3.45 0.01 0.75 0.40 1.53 0.20
Language
English 1.07 0.80 1.63 0.16 1.85 0.00 0.85 0.48
Spanish 0.88 0.58 0.45 0.03 1.13 0.53 1.02 0.92
Uruguayan 0.39 0.01 1.07 0.89 1.25 0.34 1.04 0.87
English (Turkey) 2.61 0.06 17.99 0.00 3.19 0.00 2.21 0.05
Version
No Hints 1.07 0.78 1.08 0.80 0.90 0.55 0.92 0.66
Pictures 1.91 0.00 1.07 0.80 0.89 0.47 0.94 0.73
Internet 2.00 0.15 1.72 0.39 1.60 0.20 0.63 0.27
Political view
Centre 0.92 0.69 1.26 0.48 0.81 0.23 1.26 0.20
Right 0.69 0.19 1.12 0.77 0.80 0.30 1.39 0.14
Income parents
Middle 0.79 0.26 1.02 0.95 1.20 0.31 1.08 0.66
High 0.85 0.54 1.02 0.96 1.21 0.38 1.07 0.74
Mobility prospects
Same as parents 0.92 0.75 1.27 0.49 1.01 0.96 0.95 0.81
Better than parents 1.23 0.42 1.28 0.48 0.98 0.94 1.03 0.88
Reference group: female, not employed , stud ies econom ics, answers catalan questionnaire w ith h ints on pap er, p olitica lly
left, w ith low incom e parents and exp ecting to do worse than them . The comparison answer is a lways the most frequent one.
Note: answers (d) have not b een considered in the ab ove multinom ial regressions
Table 21: E¤ect of individual characteristics on answers to questions 18 to
21. Relative Risk Ratios (part 1)
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OrthodoxAnswer A A A B
Question 18 19 20 21
RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value
c c c c
Age 0.97 0.34 0.96 0.12 1.02 0.45 0.96 0.15
Male 1.27 0.23 0.83 0.28 0.96 0.84 0.83 0.37
Employed 0.81 0.34 1.25 0.21 1.02 0.93 1.09 0.69
Subject study
Business 1.39 0.22 1.33 0.19 1.48 0.17 1.41 0.23
Social Sciences 1.13 0.73 1.06 0.85 1.18 0.65 2.47 0.01
Other 2.20 0.09 1.70 0.21 3.51 0.01 1.18 0.80
Language
English 0.86 0.66 0.93 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.86
Spanish 0.65 0.14 0.99 0.95 1.05 0.88 1.38 0.26
Uruguayan 1.00 0.99 0.81 0.50 1.44 0.35 0.98 0.97
English (Turkey) 3.29 0.04 2.49 0.08 11.02 0.00 5.21 0.00
Version
No Hints 0.74 0.25 1.08 0.72 0.91 0.74 0.99 0.96
Pictures 0.77 0.28 0.81 0.30 0.77 0.31 1.02 0.94
Internet 2.06 0.17 2.04 0.13 0.76 0.66 2.68 0.05
Political view
Centre 1.14 0.64 1.36 0.18 0.85 0.56 1.01 0.97
Right 1.15 0.69 1.53 0.14 1.04 0.91 0.79 0.53
Income parents
Middle 0.87 0.61 1.15 0.52 0.62 0.06 0.89 0.66
High 0.74 0.34 1.00 0.99 0.56 0.06 0.92 0.80
Mobility prospects
Same as parents 1.22 0.49 1.16 0.55 2.01 0.03 0.89 0.71
Better than parents 0.87 0.65 0.88 0.62 1.10 0.78 1.03 0.93
Reference group: female, not employed , stud ies econom ics, answers catalan questionnaire w ith h ints on pap er, p olitica lly
left, w ith low incom e parents and exp ecting to do worse than them . The comparison answer is a lways the most frequent one.
Note: answers (d) have not b een considered in the ab ove multinom ial regressions
Table 22: E¤ect of individual characteristics on answers to questions 18 to
21. Relative Risk Ratios (part 2)
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8 A brief conclusion
Do people view polarisation in the same way that economists do? In many
respects, yes. But in one vital respect the issue of Increased Bipolarity
they certainly do not. This point unfortunately undermines some of the
standard approaches to polarisation that have been developed in the litera-
ture. What is more the conclusion is robust under alternative representations
of the questionnaire (pictorial, numerical or verbal; with or without hints).
However, this point should be qualied if one distinguishes between Increased
Bipolarity and the related but more narrowly focused ER1 axiom of Esteban
and Ray: it emerges that ER1 can claim greater support among our respon-
dents than Increased Bipolarity but it is still only a minority whose views
on polarisation are consistent with ER1. Moreover, the most popular indices
in the literature do not enjoy much support since only a small proportion of
people endorse all the axioms that these measures require.
Do people view polarisation in the same way that they view inequality?
Here the evidence is mixed. The responses to some questions suggest that
individuals do think in terms of inequality while some others point to the
opposite conclusion. Either way it suggests that there may be room for new
thinking on the meaning of polarisation.
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A The Increased Bipolarity axiom
Consider the possible relationship between the apparently similar Axioms 1
(ER1) and 6 (Increased Bipolarity). We begin by noting two di¤erences that
make it di¢ cult to compare the two axioms simply.
 First Chakravarty and Majumdar (2001) impose a one-sidednesscon-
dition in Axiom 6 in that the implied transfers must take place on one
side or other of the median. If 1
2
p1 > p2 in Esteban and Rays discus-
sion21 then clearly the income change implied in Axiom 1 would take
place above the median. But if 1
2
p1 < p2 < p1 then the one-sidedness
condition is violated.
 Second Esteban and Ray always work in terms of log-incomes while
Chakravarty and Majumdar work only in terms of incomes. So the
income change in Axiom 1 is not a pure transfer as it is in Axiom
6 (in ER1 the point masses are moved to the geometric mean of the
two incomes, not the arithmetic mean). However it is interesting to
note Esteban and Rays remark that any other scalar can be used as
the basic perceptual variable. (p. 829). So it may be reasonable to
consider a form of the principle in Esteban and Ray (1994) in terms of
income rather than log-income.
In the light of these two points suppose we consider a modied form of
Axiom 1 that imposes a stricter condition on p1 and p2 and that permits use
of the arithmetic mean:
Axiom 10 (ER1*) Let 1
2
p1 > p2 = p3 and x1 < x2 < x3. Then, for p2=p1
su¢ ciently small and x3=x2 su¢ ciently small:
P

(p1; 2p2) ;

x1;
1
2
[x2 + x3]

> P (p;x)
Then it is clear that the conditions for ER1* are a special case of Increased
Bipolarity. In other words if P satises Increased Bipolarity then it must
satisfy ER1*, but not vice versa. So it is clear that Axiom 6 implies Axiom
10 but that neither Axiom 1 nor Axiom 10 implies Axiom 6.
21Note that in the diagram that they use to illustrate the meaning of their Axiom 1 (p.
832). it is clear that p1 > 2p2.
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B Comparison of polarisation and inequality
The following are the summary data for Follow-up study 1 (FU1) that ex-
plicitly compared results from almost-identical polarisation and inequality
questionnaires.
Question 1 Question 13a Question 13b Question 10
Polarisation
Increases 59.1 55.4 70.8 64.9
Same 3.5 8.5 7.7 16.7
Decreases 37.4 24.6 14.6 18.4
Depends 11.5 6.9
N 115 130 130 114
Inequality
Increases 75.5 78.0 82.0 73.9
Same 8.2 3.9 4.7 9.9
Decreases 16.4 10.2 9.4 16.2
Depends 7.9 3.9
N 110 127 128 111
Note: O rthodox answers in ita lics
Table 23: Increased Spread in FU1
Question 2 Question 14
Polarisation
Increases 33.6 18.5
Same 14.7 63.1
Decreases 51.7 18.5
N 116 130
Inequality
Increases 31.8 9.5
Same 14.6 52.4
Decreases 53.6 38.1
N 110 126
Note: O rthodox answers in ita lics
Table 24: Increased Bipolarity in FU1
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Question 3 Question 15
Polarisation
Increases 29.3 11.0
Same 56.9 78.7
Decreases 13.8 10.2
N 116 127
Inequality
Increases 27.36 12.6
Same 58.49 79.53
Decreases 14.15 7.87
N 106 127
Note: O rthodox answers in ita lics
Table 25: Population Principle in FU1
Question 4 Question 5 Question 16 Question 17
Polarisation
Increases 57.4 27.0 18.6 13.2
Same 32.2 48.7 69.0 57.4
Decreases 10.4 24.4 1.6 15.5
Depends 10.9 14.0
N 115 115 129 129
Inequality
Increases 61.1 15.7 17.3 1.6
Same 31.5 49.1 70.1 67.5
Decreases 7.4 35.2 5.5 20.6
Depends 7.1 10.3
N 108 108 127 126
Note: O rthodox answers in ita lics
Table 26: Scale and Translation Invariance in FU1
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Axiom 2 Axiom 3
Question 6 Question 18 Question 7 Question 19
Polarisation
Increases 67.5 53.2 64.9 48.4
Same 9.7 12.7 8.8 27.3
Decreases 22.8 19.1 26.3 14.8
Depends 15.1 9.4
N 114 126 114 128
Inequality
Increases 62.7 48.4 82.7 52.8
Same 12.7 15.1 5.5 26.8
Decreases 24.6 21.4 11.8 11.8
Depends 15.1 8.7
N 110 126 110 127
Table 27: Axioms 2 and 3 in FU1
Question 8 Question 20
Polarisation
Increases 40.7 32.5
Same 6.8 19.8
Decreases 52.5 47.6
N 118 126
Inequality
Increases 18.9 15.7
Same 9.0 24.0
Decreases 72.1 60.3
N 111 121
Note: O rthodox answers in ita lics
Table 28: Axiom 4 in FU1
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Question 9 Question 21
Polarisation
Increases 49.6 Increases always 31.0
Same 7.8 Decreases always 8.7
Decreases 42.6 Increases rst, then decreases 13.5
Decreases rst, then increases 18.3
Same 18.3
None 10.3
N 115 N 126
Inequality
Increases 62.4 Increases always 38.7
Same 5.5 Decreases always 9.2
Decreases 32.1 Increases rst, then decreases 9.2
Decreases rst, then increases 11.8
Same 25.2
None 5.9
N 109 N 119
Note: O rthodox answers in ita lics
Table 29: Non-monotonicity in FU1
42
C The questionnaires
Following is an example of the pictorial version of the questionnaire used
in the present study. All the variants used in the study can be found at
http://darp.lse.ac.uk/polarisation/.
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INCOME POLARISATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
This questionnaire concerns people’s attitude to income polarisation. We would be interested in your 
views, based on hypothetical situations. Because it is about attitudes there are no “right” answers. Some 
of the possible answers correspond to assumptions commonly made by economists: but these assumptions 
may not be good ones. Your responses will help to shed some light on this, and we would like to thank 
you for your participation. The questionnaire is anonymous. Please do not write your name on it. 
 
Alfaland is a small country for which two economic programmes have been proposed. It is known that the 
programmes will have an identical effect on the population — except in so far as incomes are concerned 
(all the people in Alfaland are identical in every respect other than income). In questions 1 to 10 you are 
asked about two alternative lists of incomes A and B (in Alfaland local currency) which result from each 
of these programmes. We have drawn attention to the parts where the lists differ by highlighting them in 
bold Please state which programme you consider would make the community of Alfaland more 
polarised by circling A or B. If you consider that each of the programmes would make the community 
equally polarised then circle both A and B. 
 
 
 
 
1. A = (5, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50) B = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50) 
 
2. A = (7, 8, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50) B = (5, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50) 
 
3. A = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 60) B = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 
   50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 60, 60) 
 
4. A = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50) B = (20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100) 
 
5. A = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50) B = (20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 60, 60, 60, 60, 60) 
 
6. A = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 70, 70, 100, 100, 100) B = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 90, 90, 100, 100, 100) 
 
7. A = (10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 90, 90, 90) B = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90) 
 
8. A = (10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50,  B = (50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50,100,100, 
 100, 100, 100, 100, 100)  100, 100, 100, 100, 100) 
 
9. A = (5, 5, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 60, 60) B = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50) 
 
10. A = (5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 60, 60, 60, 60, 60) B = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50) 
 
 
Q1h 1
In each of the questions 11 to 19 you are presented with a hypothetical change and some views about that 
change. Please circle the letter alongside the view that corresponds most closely to your own. Feel free to 
add any comments which explain the reason for your choice. 
 
11) Suppose there is a society consisting of two groups of people with many individuals in each group. 
One of the groups contains identical low-income people while the other group contains identical high-
income people. If a few of the low-income individuals see their income drop by half, then:  
a) Income polarisation decreases because society is no longer structured in two sharply defined groups 
b) Income polarisation remains the same because one or very few individuals do not make any 
difference. 
c) Income polarisation increases because the income difference between the poorest and the richest is 
now larger. 
d) Whether income polarisation increases/decreases/remains the same depends on the level of income 
 
Suppose that instead of a few low-income individuals seeing their income drop by half, a few high-
income individuals see their incomes double. Then income polarisation ... 
a) decreases. 
b) increases. 
c) remains unchanged.  
d) may move either way, depending on the level of income. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 1? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
12) Suppose we transfer income from a person who has more income to a person who has less, without 
changing anyone else’s income. The two persons belong either to the poorest 50% or to the richest 50%, 
and after the transfer the person who formerly had more still has more. Income polarisation in this 
society... 
a) has fallen because the person doing the transfer is further away after the transfer from the person who 
was immediately richer. 
b) has increased because the two persons involved in the transfer are closer to each other after the 
transfer. 
c) has not changed. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 2? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
 
In each of the questions 13 to 15, consider a society with only two groups which have different levels of 
income. All high-income people have the same income and all low-income people also have the same 
income. 
 
13) Suppose we replicate this society with an exact copy of itself. After the replication, income 
polarisation 
a) increases because there is more people in each group. 
b) decreases. 
c) remains the same because the percentage of people in each group is the same as before. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 3? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
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14) Suppose we double the income of each person in the above society. 
a) The two income groups have the same percentage of people and income share, and the relative 
income difference between the two groups has not changed, so income polarisation remains the same. 
b) The income gap between the rich and the poor group has increased, so income polarisation has 
increased. 
c) After doubling incomes the low-income group might have enough money for basic needs, so income 
polarisation has decreased.  
d) Whether income polarisation increases/decreases/remains the same depends on the level of income 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 4? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
15) Suppose we add the same fixed amount to the incomes of each person in the above society. 
a) Income polarisation has fallen because the relative distance between the two groups has decreased. 
b) Income polarisation remains the same because the absolute distance between the two groups has not 
changed. 
c) Income polarisation has increased. 
d) Whether income polarisation increases/decreases/remains the same depends on the level of income 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 5? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
16) Consider a society with only three income groups where all persons within a group have the same 
income level. The first group is the most populated one and has the lowest income level. The second 
group is less populated than the first one but has the highest income level. The third group is the least 
populated one and has an intermediate income level, closer to the highest income level of the second 
group than to the lowest income level of the first group. Suppose we add some income to each person 
belonging to the third group. 
a) Income polarisation increases because the third group is closer to the second group and further away 
from the first one, so the two least populated groups become closer to each other. 
b) Income polarisation falls. 
c) Income polarisation remains unchanged. 
d) Whether income polarisation increases/decreases/remains the same depends on the levels of income 
in each group 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 6? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
17) Consider a society with three income groups with similar population shares and where all persons 
within a group have the same income level. Suppose that half the population of the intermediate group 
moves to the lowest-income group and the other half moves to the highest-income one. 
a) As the intermediate group disappears income polarisation increases 
b) As the number of groups is smaller, income polarisation falls. 
c) Income polarisation remains unchanged. 
d) Whether income polarisation increases/decreases/remains the same depends on the levels of income 
in each group. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 7? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
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18) Consider a society with three income groups where all persons within a group have the same income 
level: the income gap between those in the lowest income group and the middle group is about the same 
as the gap between those in the middle group and the highest income group. The lowest income group has 
a very small population; the middle group has a very large population. Suppose we add to the incomes of 
lowest-income group people an amount that is so large that they are lifted to the level of the high-income 
group. 
a) Income polarisation increases because there are now two sharply defined groups. 
b) Income polarisation decreases because the lowest income group disappears. 
c) Income polarisation does not change. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 8? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
19) Consider a society consisting of two groups of people with many individuals in each group. One of 
the groups contains identical low-income people while the other group contains identical high-income 
people. Suppose that one by one, low-income individuals become equally poorer and high-income 
individuals become equally richer. When half of the individuals have moved away from the original 
groups, the society has four income groups, and as individuals keep on moving the society ends up having 
once again two groups of identical poorer and richer people.  
a) Income polarisation increases continuously because persons are systematically moving further away 
from each other 
b) Income polarisation decreases continuously 
c) Income polarisation at first increases and then decreases because at first the number of groups 
doubles and then halves. 
d) Income polarisation at first decreases and then increases because at first the number of groups 
doubles and then halves. 
e) Income polarisation remains the same throughout 
f) None of the above. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to questions 1, 9 and 10? If so please 
write your new responses here: 
1:  
9:  
10:  
 
 
 
Finally, we would be grateful for some information about yourself: 
 
• Are you male or female? M/F 
• What is your age?   _____ years 
• What is your special subject of study? __________ 
• Were you employed before university? Yes / No 
 
 “extreme
  left”
“extreme
right”• How would you rate your political views? 
Please put a √ on this scale. 
  “very 
  Poor” 
“very 
Rich”
”
• How would you rate your family’s income in 
1995? Please put a √ on this scale.   
  “very 
  Poor” 
“very 
Rich”
”
• How would you rate your own income 
prospects in the year 2015? Please put a √ 
on this scale.  
 
 
Thanks once again for your help! 
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INCOME POLARISATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
This questionnaire concerns people’s attitude to income polarisation. We would be interested in your 
views, based on hypothetical situations. Because it is about attitudes there are no “right” answers. Some 
of the possible answers correspond to assumptions commonly made by economists: but these assumptions 
may not be good ones. Your responses will help to shed some light on this, and we would like to thank 
you for your participation. The questionnaire is anonymous. Please do not write your name on it. 
 
Alfaland is a small country for which two economic programmes have been proposed. It is known that the 
programmes will have an identical effect on the population — except in so far as incomes are concerned 
(all the people in Alfaland are identical in every respect other than income). In questions 1 to 10 you are 
asked about two alternative lists of incomes A and B (in Alfaland local currency) which result from each 
of these programmes. Please state which programme you consider would make the community of 
Alfaland more polarised by circling A or B. If you consider that each of the programmes would make the 
community equally polarised then circle both A and B. 
 
 
 
 
1. A = (5, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50) B = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50) 
 
2. A = (7, 8, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50) B = (5, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50) 
 
3. A = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 60) B = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 
  50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 60, 60) 
 
4. A = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50) B = (20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100) 
 
5. A = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50) B = (20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 60, 60, 60, 60, 60) 
 
6. A = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 70, 70, 100, 100, 100) B = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 90, 90, 100, 100, 100) 
 
7. A = (10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 90, 90, 90) B = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90) 
 
8. A = (10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50,  B = (50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50,100,100, 
 100, 100, 100, 100, 100)  100, 100, 100, 100, 100) 
 
9. A = (5, 5, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 60, 60) B = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50) 
 
10. A = (5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 60, 60, 60, 60, 60) B = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50) 
 
 
Q1n 1
In each of the questions 11 to 19 you are presented with a hypothetical change and some views about that 
change. Please circle the letter alongside the view that corresponds most closely to your own. Feel free to 
add any comments which explain the reason for your choice. 
 
11) Suppose there is a society consisting of two groups of people with many individuals in each group. 
One of the groups contains identical low-income people while the other group contains identical high-
income people. If a few of the low-income individuals see their income drop by half, then:  
a) Income polarisation decreases because society is no longer structured in two sharply defined groups 
b) Income polarisation remains the same because one or very few individuals do not make any 
difference. 
c) Income polarisation increases because the income difference between the poorest and the richest is 
now larger. 
d) Whether income polarisation increases/decreases/remains the same depends on the level of income 
 
Suppose that instead of a few low-income individuals seeing their income drop by half, a few high-
income individuals see their incomes double. Then income polarisation ... 
a) decreases. 
b) increases. 
c) remains unchanged.  
d) may move either way, depending on the level of income. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 1? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
12) Suppose we transfer income from a person who has more income to a person who has less, without 
changing anyone else’s income. The two persons belong either to the poorest 50% or to the richest 50%, 
and after the transfer the person who formerly had more still has more. Income polarisation in this 
society... 
a) has fallen because the person doing the transfer is further away after the transfer from the person who 
was immediately richer. 
b) has increased because the two persons involved in the transfer are closer to each other after the 
transfer. 
c) has not changed. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 2? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
 
In each of the questions 13 to 15, consider a society with only two groups which have different levels of 
income. All high-income people have the same income and all low-income people also have the same 
income. 
 
13) Suppose we replicate this society with an exact copy of itself. After the replication, income 
polarisation 
a) increases because there is more people in each group. 
b) decreases. 
c) remains the same because the percentage of people in each group is the same as before. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 3? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
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14) Suppose we double the income of each person in the above society. 
a) The two income groups have the same percentage of people and income share, and the relative 
income difference between the two groups has not changed, so income polarisation remains the same. 
b) The income gap between the rich and the poor group has increased, so income polarisation has 
increased. 
c) After doubling incomes the low-income group might have enough money for basic needs, so income 
polarisation has decreased.  
d) Whether income polarisation increases/decreases/remains the same depends on the level of income 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 4? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
15) Suppose we add the same fixed amount to the incomes of each person in the above society. 
a) Income polarisation has fallen because the relative distance between the two groups has decreased. 
b) Income polarisation remains the same because the absolute distance between the two groups has not 
changed. 
c) Income polarisation has increased. 
d) Whether income polarisation increases/decreases/remains the same depends on the level of income 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 5? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
16) Consider a society with only three income groups where all persons within a group have the same 
income level. The first group is the most populated one and has the lowest income level. The second 
group is less populated than the first one but has the highest income level. The third group is the least 
populated one and has an intermediate income level, closer to the highest income level of the second 
group than to the lowest income level of the first group. Suppose we add some income to each person 
belonging to the third group. 
a) Income polarisation increases because the third group is closer to the second group and further away 
from the first one, so the two least populated groups become closer to each other. 
b) Income polarisation falls. 
c) Income polarisation remains unchanged. 
d) Whether income polarisation increases/decreases/remains the same depends on the levels of income 
in each group 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 6? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
17) Consider a society with three income groups with similar population shares and where all persons 
within a group have the same income level. Suppose that half the population of the intermediate group 
moves to the lowest-income group and the other half moves to the highest-income one. 
a) As the intermediate group disappears income polarisation increases 
b) As the number of groups is smaller, income polarisation falls. 
c) Income polarisation remains unchanged. 
d) Whether income polarisation increases/decreases/remains the same depends on the levels of income 
in each group. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 7? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
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18) Consider a society with three income groups where all persons within a group have the same income 
level: the income gap between those in the lowest income group and the middle group is about the same 
as the gap between those in the middle group and the highest income group. The lowest income group has 
a very small population; the middle group has a very large population. Suppose we add to the incomes of 
lowest-income group people an amount that is so large that they are lifted to the level of the high-income 
group. 
a) Income polarisation increases because there are now two sharply defined groups. 
b) Income polarisation decreases because the lowest income group disappears. 
c) Income polarisation does not change. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 8? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
19) Consider a society consisting of two groups of people with many individuals in each group. One of 
the groups contains identical low-income people while the other group contains identical high-income 
people. Suppose that one by one, low-income individuals become equally poorer and high-income 
individuals become equally richer. When half of the individuals have moved away from the original 
groups, the society has four income groups, and as individuals keep on moving the society ends up having 
once again two groups of identical poorer and richer people.  
a) Income polarisation increases continuously because persons are systematically moving further away 
from each other 
b) Income polarisation decreases continuously 
c) Income polarisation at first increases and then decreases because at first the number of groups 
doubles and then halves. 
d) Income polarisation at first decreases and then increases because at first the number of groups 
doubles and then halves. 
e) Income polarisation remains the same throughout 
f) None of the above. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to questions 1, 9 and 10? If so please 
write your new responses here: 
1:  
9:  
10:  
 
 
 
Finally, we would be grateful for some information about yourself: 
 
• Are you male or female? M/F 
• What is your age?   _____ years 
• What is your special subject of study? __________ 
• Were you employed before university? Yes / No 
 
 “extreme
  left”
“extreme
right”• How would you rate your political views? 
Please put a √ on this scale. 
  “very 
  Poor” 
“very 
Rich”
”
• How would you rate your family’s income in 
1995? Please put a √ on this scale.   
  “very 
  Poor” 
“very 
Rich”
”
• How would you rate your own income 
prospects in the year 2015? Please put a √ 
on this scale.  
 
 
Thanks once again for your help! 
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INCOME POLARISATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
This questionnaire concerns people’s attitude to income polarisation. We would be 
interested in your views, based on hypothetical situations. Because it is about attitudes 
there are no “right” answers. Some of the possible answers correspond to assumptions 
commonly made by economists: but these assumptions may not be good ones. Your 
responses will help to shed some light on this, and we would like to thank you for your 
participation. The questionnaire is anonymous. Please do not write your name on it. 
 
Alfaland is a small country for which two economic programmes have been proposed. It 
is known that the programmes will have an identical effect on the population — except 
in so far as incomes are concerned (all the people in Alfaland are identical in every 
respect other than income). In the pictogram questions 1 to 10 you are asked about two 
alternative lists of incomes A and B (in Alfaland local currency) which result from each 
of these programmes. Please state which programme you consider would make the 
community of Alfaland more polarised by ticking the appropriate box. 
 
 
 
Q1p
21: A=(5,10,10,10,10,50,50,50,50,50)
B=(10,10,10,10,10,50,50,50,50,50)
0 5 10 20 30 40 50
$
0 5 10 20 30 40 50
$
A
B
 A is more polarised
 B is more polarised  
 polarisation is the same in A and B
Please check (b) one:
2: A=(7,8,10,10,10,50,50,50,50,50)
B=(5,10,10,10,10,50,50,50,50,50)
0 5 10 20 30 40 50
$
0 5 10 20 30 40 50
$
A
B
 A is more polarised
 B is more polarised  
 polarisation is the same in A and B
Please check (b) one:
33:                A=(10,10,10,10,10,50,50,50,50,60)
B=(10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,50,50,50,50,50,50,50,50,60,60)
0 5 10 20 30 40 50
$
A
B
0 5 10 20 30 40 50
$
 A is more polarised
 B is more polarised  
 polarisation is the same in A and B
Please check (b) one:
4: A=(10,10,10,10,10,50,50,50,50,50)
B=(20,20,20,20,20,100,100,100,100,100)
$
$
A
B
0 10 20 40 60 80 10030 50
0 10 20 40 60 80 10030 50
 A is more polarised
 B is more polarised  
 polarisation is the same in A and B
Please check (b) one:
40 10 20 30 40 60
$
50
5: A=(10,10,10,10,10,50,50,50,50,50)
B=(20,20,20,20,20,60,60,60,60,60)
A
B
 A is more polarised
 B is more polarised  
 polarisation is the same in A and B
Please check (b) one:
0 10 20 30 40 60
$
50
6: A=(10,10,10,10,10,70,70,100,100,100)
B=(10,10,10,10,10,90,90,100,100,100)
$
A
B
$
0 10 20 40 60 80 10030 50
0 10 20 40 60 80 10030 50
70 90
 A is more polarised
 B is more polarised  
 polarisation is the same in A and B
Please check (b) one:
70 90
57: A=(10,10,10,50,50,50,50,90,90,90)
B=(10,10,10,10,10,90,90,90,90,90)
$
$
A
B
0 10 20 40 60 80 10030 50
0 10 20 40 60 80 10030 50
 A is more polarised
 B is more polarised  
 polarisation is the same in A and B
Please check (b) one:
70 90
70 90
8: A=(10,10,50,50,50,50,50,50,50,100,100,100,100,100)
B=(50,50,50,50,50,50,50,100,100,100,100,100,100,100)
$
$
0 10 20 40 60 80 10030 50
0 10 20 40 60 80 10030 50
 A is more polarised
 B is more polarised  
 polarisation is the same in A and B
Please check (b) one:
70 90
70 90
A
B
60 10 20 30 40 60
$
50
9: A=(5,5,10,10,10,50,50,50,60,60)
B=(10,10,10,10,10,50,50,50,50,50)
A
B
 A is more polarised
 B is more polarised  
 polarisation is the same in A and B
Please check (b) one:
0 10 20 30 40 60
$
50
5
5
0 10 20 30 40 60
$
50
10: A=(5,5,5,5,5,60,60,60,60,60)
B=(10,10,10,10,10,50,50,50,50,50)
A
B
 A is more polarised
 B is more polarised  
 polarisation is the same in A and B
Please check (b) one:
0 10 20 30 40 60
$
50
5
5
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In each of the questions 11 to 19 you are presented with a hypothetical change and some views about that 
change. Please circle the letter alongside the view that corresponds most closely to your own. Feel free to 
add any comments which explain the reason for your choice. 
 
11) Suppose there is a society consisting of two groups of people with many individuals in each group. 
One of the groups contains identical low-income people while the other group contains identical high-
income people. If a few of the low-income individuals see their income drop by half, then:  
a) Income polarisation decreases because society is no longer structured in two sharply defined groups 
b) Income polarisation remains the same because one or very few individuals do not make any 
difference. 
c) Income polarisation increases because the income difference between the poorest and the richest is 
now larger. 
d) Whether income polarisation increases/decreases/remains the same depends on the level of income 
 
Suppose that instead of a few low-income individuals seeing their income drop by half, a few high-
income individuals see their incomes double. Then income polarisation ... 
a) decreases. 
b) increases. 
c) remains unchanged.  
d) may move either way, depending on the level of income. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 1? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
12) Suppose we transfer income from a person who has more income to a person who has less, without 
changing anyone else’s income. The two persons belong either to the poorest 50% or to the richest 50%, 
and after the transfer the person who formerly had more still has more. Income polarisation in this 
society... 
a) has fallen because the person doing the transfer is further away after the transfer from the person who 
was immediately richer. 
b) has increased because the two persons involved in the transfer are closer to each other after the 
transfer. 
c) has not changed. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 2? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
 
In each of the questions 13 to 15, consider a society with only two groups which have different levels of 
income. All high-income people have the same income and all low-income people also have the same 
income. 
 
13) Suppose we replicate this society with an exact copy of itself. After the replication, income 
polarisation 
a) increases because there is more people in each group. 
b) decreases. 
c) remains the same because the percentage of people in each group is the same as before. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 3? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 8
 
14) Suppose we double the income of each person in the above society. 
a) The two income groups have the same percentage of people and income share, and the relative 
income difference between the two groups has not changed, so income polarisation remains the same. 
b) The income gap between the rich and the poor group has increased, so income polarisation has 
increased. 
c) After doubling incomes the low-income group might have enough money for basic needs, so income 
polarisation has decreased.  
d) Whether income polarisation increases/decreases/remains the same depends on the level of income 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 4? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
15) Suppose we add the same fixed amount to the incomes of each person in the above society. 
a) Income polarisation has fallen because the relative distance between the two groups has decreased. 
b) Income polarisation remains the same because the absolute distance between the two groups has not 
changed. 
c) Income polarisation has increased. 
d) Whether income polarisation increases/decreases/remains the same depends on the level of income 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 5? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
16) Consider a society with only three income groups where all persons within a group have the same 
income level. The first group is the most populated one and has the lowest income level. The second 
group is less populated than the first one but has the highest income level. The third group is the least 
populated one and has an intermediate income level, closer to the highest income level of the second 
group than to the lowest income level of the first group. Suppose we add some income to each person 
belonging to the third group. 
a) Income polarisation increases because the third group is closer to the second group and further away 
from the first one, so the two least populated groups become closer to each other. 
b) Income polarisation falls. 
c) Income polarisation remains unchanged. 
d) Whether income polarisation increases/decreases/remains the same depends on the levels of income 
in each group 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 6? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
17) Consider a society with three income groups with similar population shares and where all persons 
within a group have the same income level. Suppose that half the population of the intermediate group 
moves to the lowest-income group and the other half moves to the highest-income one. 
a) As the intermediate group disappears income polarisation increases 
b) As the number of groups is smaller, income polarisation falls. 
c) Income polarisation remains unchanged. 
d) Whether income polarisation increases/decreases/remains the same depends on the levels of income 
in each group. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 7? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 9
18) Consider a society with three income groups where all persons within a group have the same income 
level: the income gap between those in the lowest income group and the middle group is about the same 
as the gap between those in the middle group and the highest income group. The lowest income group has 
a very small population; the middle group has a very large population. Suppose we add to the incomes of 
lowest-income group people an amount that is so large that they are lifted to the level of the high-income 
group. 
a) Income polarisation increases because there are now two sharply defined groups. 
b) Income polarisation decreases because the lowest income group disappears. 
c) Income polarisation does not change. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to question 8? If so please write your new 
response (“A” or “B” or “A and B”) here: 
 
 
 
19) Consider a society consisting of two groups of people with many individuals in each group. One of 
the groups contains identical low-income people while the other group contains identical high-income 
people. Suppose that one by one, low-income individuals become equally poorer and high-income 
individuals become equally richer. When half of the individuals have moved away from the original 
groups, the society has four income groups, and as individuals keep on moving the society ends up having 
once again two groups of identical poorer and richer people.  
a) Income polarisation increases continuously because persons are systematically moving further away 
from each other 
b) Income polarisation decreases continuously 
c) Income polarisation at first increases and then decreases because at first the number of groups 
doubles and then halves. 
d) Income polarisation at first decreases and then increases because at first the number of groups 
doubles and then halves. 
e) Income polarisation remains the same throughout 
f) None of the above. 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answer to questions 1, 9 and 10? If so please 
write your new responses here: 
1:  
9:  
10:  
 
 
 
Finally, we would be grateful for some information about yourself: 
 
• Are you male or female? M/F 
• What is your age?   _____ years 
• What is your special subject of study? __________ 
• Were you employed before university? Yes / No 
 
 
• How would you rate your political views? 
Please put a √ on this scale. 
 
• How would you rate your family’s income in 
1995? Please put a √ on this scale.   
 
• How would you rate your own income 
prospects in the year 2015? Please put a √ 
on this scale.  
 
 
Thanks once again for your help! 
 “very 
  Poor” 
“very 
Rich”
”
“extreme
  left”
“extreme
right”
 “very 
  Poor” 
“very 
Rich”
”
